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Abstract
Although international programs for carbon offsets play an important role in
current and prospective climate change policy, they continue to be very controver-
sial. Assymmetric information creates several incentive problems, include adverse
selection and moral hazard, in offset markets. The current regulatory focus on ad-
ditionality tends to paint all these problems with a broad brush without proper
consideration of the context or their implications.
1 Introduction
While the advancement of market-based environmental mechanisms has been much cele-
brated in the economics literature over the past decade, the increasing popularity of these
mechanisms has served to highlight shortcomings in their implementation. One major
challenge for regulators has been to reach the proper scope, over both geography and
industrial sectors, over which market-based mechanisms are allowed to operate. For lo-
calized pollutants, such as SOx and NOx, the problem has been localized “hot spots” of
emissions that have been in a sense a result from a scope that is too broad, or at least
fails to account for the differential damage caused by emissions from varying locations.1.
In the climate policy arena, a large challenge has been to mitigate leakage of greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from regions falling under caps to those without GHG regulations.2
∗Associate Professor, Cargill Chair in Energy Economics, Dept. of Economics, Iowa State University,
and NBER. Email: jimb@iastate.edu. I am grateful for helpful discussion and comments from Severin
Borenstein, Tristan Brown, Erin Mansur, Stephen Holland.
1Carlson, et. al, 2000, Muller and Mendohlson, 2009, Fowlie, 2010.
2Bushnell, et. al., 2008, Fischer and Fox, 2009.
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In addition to these geographic issues, there are also concerns about inconsistent reg-
ulation across the polluting industries. For example, Fowlie, et al. (2008) find that the
power sector has carried a far higher burden in reducing NOx emissions than has the
transportation sector. Indeed, allowance trading, and other market-based mechanisms
were largely intended to address such disparities. Unfortunately, several factors conspire
to limit the reach of cap-and-trade systems even within a single regulatory jurisdiction.
The costs of monitoring and implementing allowance trading systems has largely limited
their application to large single-point sources to date. While the “upstream” regulation
of mobile sources may be a viable option for some industries and pollutants, there are
serious potential limitations when there is a large potential to limit process emissions.3 In
many cases important sources of emissions not included in legislation establishing regula-
tory authority, such as with agricultural sources and the clean water act. Further, some
non-point sources of emissions, such as those associated with land-use, would be difficult
to integrate into a cap-and-trade program under any circumstances. Last, some industries
are more effective at deploying their political influence to deflect attempts to regulate their
emissions as intensively as other industries.
In the face of these jurisdictional, economic, and political, limitations to the broad
application of cap-and-trade, offsets have emerged as an appealing tool for attempting
to breach the regulatory barriers between regions and sectors. The primary distinction
between offset programs and other forms of regulation are that offsets pay firms to reduce
their emissions rather than raise the costs of continuing to emit. The payments allow
the process to work as a voluntary program, bypassing jurisdictional issues by in theory
providing incentives for firms to self-regulate. The entire concept of offset programs is
therefore closely related to the question of the ‘reach’ of traditional regulations. If all
sources of emissions would fall under traditional regulations, there would be less need to
extend those regulations through offsets.
Although the fundamental need for offsets is rooted in the limits of regulatory juris-
diction, today’s programs are in fact motivated by a host of goals. A primary goal for
many regulated industries is cost control. The prospect of a deep pool of offset projects
providing a potentially low-cost supply of reductions creates an effective cap on allowance
prices in a cap-and-trade system.4 Among developing nations and many NGO’s, offset
3Mansur, Forthcoming.
4The economic analysis of proposed GHG regulations by agencies such as U.S. Environmental Protec-
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mechanisms have been seen as an important new source of capital to aid in development
and the alleviation of poverty. For firms and individuals outside of sectors that might fall
directly under a cap, such as the U.S. agricultural sector, an offset mechanism offers a
potentially lucrative new source of revenue.5 From the perspective of economic efficiency,
the great promise of an offset market is the potential for reducing GHG emissions at a
much lower cost. To the extent that low-cost options for reducing emissions exist in sectors
that are not directly regulated under a cap, an offset market allows for these “low-hanging
fruit” to be harvested in place of more expensive reductions from the capped sector.
The most significant current global offset program, the Clean Development Mecha-
nism, emerged from the Kyoto treaty.6 It combined the desires for flexible market-based
mechanisms with the goal of financing a low-carbon development trajectory in emerging
economies. Offset mechanisms comprise a prominent part of the proposed U.S. CO2 mar-
ket articulated in H.R. 2454 (the “Waxman-Markey” bill). There are also important roles
for offsets in regional U.S. carbon markets such as in California and the northeast U.S., as
well as voluntary carbon offset markets.
However, despite the alluring potential of offset mechanisms for reducing mitigation
costs and overcoming jurisdictional boundaries, the programs remain quite controversial.
At the heart of most criticisms of offset programs is the concern that the programs are
not in fact yielding the emissions reductions implied by their transacted quantities. This
problem relates to two fundamental attributes of offset programs. First, offset programs
require a determination of an emissions baseline from which the attributable reductions
can be measured. Assuming the institutional issues described above could be overcome,
regulators should be able to reliably verify the actual emissions of a facility, or at least a
sector. However, baselines (e.g. the emissions in the absence of an offset) by definition
cannot be observed since they are the product of a “what-if” exercise. The regulator can
hope to accurately measure the emissions of a facility after it registers for an offset, but
can only estimate what those emissions would have been if the facility had not sold any
offsets.
The second confounding attribute of offset programs is that participation in them is
tion Agency and the California Air Resources Board highlight the sensitivity of future allowance prices to
the cost and availability of offsets.
5USDA, 2009.
6The evolution and growth of offset markets is recounted in Lecoq and Ambrosi (2007), and Grubb, et
al. (2010).
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voluntary. Unlike the participants in a cap-and-trade program, firms that sell offsets
self-select, or “opt-in,” to the programs. This combination of imperfect measurement
of baselines and self-selection make offset regimes vulnerable to two classic regulatory
problems; moral hazard and adverse selection. The latter involves paying too much to
firms with already low emissions, while the former involves firms actively taking steps to
inflate their baselines.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of adverse selection. In this regard, the primary
concern is the phenomenon that offset sales will be particularly attractive to firms’ whose
true baselines are lower than the regulators’ estimates. These firms can essentially be paid
for “reductions” that would have happened anyway. In the jargon of offset policy, this
problem is known as additionality. In H.R. 2454, additional is defined as:
The term additional, when used with respect to reductions or avoidance, or to se-
questration of greenhouse gases, means reductions, avoidance, or sequestration that
result in a lower level of net greenhouse gas emissions or atmospheric concentration
than would occur in the absence of an offset project.
The additionality problem has come to dominate the debates over offset markets, and
there is a large amount of enforcement language and effort put into trying to mitigate it.
There is also a rich literature on environmental regulation under imperfect information
that has also focused on this problem. In this literature, the main culprit is adverse se-
lection. Particularly relevant for this discussion is the work of Montero (1999 and 2000),
which examines the consequences of voluntary “opt-in” to a cap-and-trade program. These
opt-in provisions, such in the US SO2 program, bear many similarities to offset mecha-
nisms. In Montero’s derivation, allowing opt-in produces a trade-off between the efficiency
gains of lower-cost abatement and the “excess emissions” resulting from adverse selection.
Although some of these voluntary facilities may provide less true abatement than expected,
the abatement costs of these opt-in facilities may be dramtically lower than those under the
cap. The intuition behind this trade-off is that, although opt-in may create excess emis-
sions, the welfare loss from this excess is more than made-up for in savings on abatement
costs.
Even beyond the trade-off articulated in Montero’s work, some of the focus on addition-
ality and the mechanisms deployed to combat it may be misguided in some context. As the
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model in this paper explores, there are conditions under which the sale of offsets improves
efficiency even if there is no abatement cost advantages in the uncapped sector. The key
element of the model is the uncertainty of emissions in the uncapped sector. At issue is
the extent to which the overestimate of emissions baselines is a firm-specific or aggregate
phenomenon. If the additivity problem stems from the fact that the regulator overesti-
mated the baselines from the entire sector, then the implications of non-additionality in
an offset program can be very different. The result is still less “abatement” than expected,
but this does not necessarily translate into more emissions than expected.
2 A Two Sector Model
We construct a model of two polluting sectors. The first sector, labelled “capped” is di-
rectly regulated through a cap and trade program, while the second, “uncapped,”sector
is not. Each sector is populated by many small firms, assumed to act in a perfectly com-
petitive fashion with regards to the emissions and offset markets. The expected aggregate
emissions, absent any regulation, in each sector is Ec and Euc, respectively.
The focus of the model will be on the distribution of, and regulators knowledge of,
“business as usual” or baseline emissions. As such I make several simplifying assumptions
regarding other attributes of the market. We assume that the regulator cannot observe
baseline emissions but can observe the actual expost emissions of both firms in the capped
sector and firms that choose to sell offsets. Thus an offset sale is verified by observing zero
emissions from a facility and it is assumed to achieve a reduction in emissions from the
estimated baseline level of eˆ down to a level of zero. We define marginal abatement costs
as cc(a) in the capped sector and cuc in the uncapped sector. These are represented by the
dashed red lines in figure 1.
Assumption A1 : An offset sale is verified by observing zero emissions from a facility and
it is assumed to achieve a reduction in emissions from the estimated baseline level of eˆ
down to a level of zero.
Assumption A2 : Abatement costs cc(a) are weakly increasing and weakly convex in the
capped sector.
Assumption A3 : Uncapped sector marginal abatement costs cuc are constant.
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Figure 1 illustrates the supply of abatement under perfect information, so total un-
regulated emissions, e.g. the “business as usual” (BAU) scenario, is represented as the
intersection of the horizontal and vertical axis in figure 1. Reductions, or abatement, from
BAU is represented by movement to the right along the horizontal axis. Total emissions
from both sectors would therefore be expected to be Ec + Euc.
Figure 1: Offset Market with Perfect Information
Marginal abatement costs for the entire economy would be the horizontal sum of these
functions, ctot(a), represented by the solid red line. The benefits of abatement are repre-
sented by the marginal abatement curve, B. These are the upward sloping and downward
sloping solid lines, respectively, in figure 1. I assume here simply that the cap is set to
achieve total abatement A*, implying emissions qcap + Euc. As shown here, the goal of
limiting total emissions to qcap + Euc can be achieved solely through mitigation by the
capped sector.
That does not mean that this is the most efficient way of reaching that target, however.
For the moment I will assume both that offsets are supplied competitively (e.g. at the
marginal cost of abatement) and that there is no information problem. The regulator can
observe baselines in the uncapped sector and all implied reductions are in fact realized.
Under these assumptions, abatement from the capped sector is limited to sources whose
abatement costs fall below the offset costs, cuc. The capped sector abates an amount A
c,
and the remainder is provided by the uncapped sector. Total savings equal the grey shaded
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area in figure. 1
Total emissions after offset sells can be expressed as
qcap + eˆ ∗ θγ + eˆ ∗ (1− θγ)
where θγ is the share of the uncapped sector selling offsets and is defined in more detail
below. The second term represents the transacted offset amount, in terms of emissions
and the third term is the expected remaining emissions from the uncapped sector. Were
it not for the imperfect information, emissions would in fact be the expected qcap + eˆ, the
same as with no offsets, but under the assumptions of the model, at lower costs.
2.1 Model of adverse selection
We now consider the implications of imperfect information. The key information asym-
metry lies in the estimates of business as usual (BAU), or baseline emissions, in particular
for the uncapped sector. Here we depart from the standard asymmetry framework such
as that utilized by Montero (2000) and more recently by Mason and ???? (2010). It is
common in the mechanism design literature to assume that the regulator knows the distri-
bution of information (here expected emissions, or “baselines”) but does not know where
any specific firm falls in that distribution. We treat this as a special case, but also want
to account for the very real prospect that the regulator may not have perfect information
about even the aggregate distribution of baselines. In particular the regulator may be
wrong about the expected mean baseline.
More formally, let marginal emissions from the uncapped sector be
ei = e¯+ a ∗ (θi − 0.5) (1)
where θi ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be distributed with density f(θ) and mean of 0.5. Note
that half the population of uncapped firms will have baseline emissions below the mean e¯,
while the other half will have baselines above e¯.
To sharpen the focus of the model, I further restrict the distribution of θ.
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Assumption A4 : Baseline emissions ei = ei = e¯+a∗(θi−0.5) and θ is distributed uniformly
∈ [0, 1].
The assumption of a uniform distribution of θ allows for an interpretation of θi as the
share of firms selling offsets. The shift of 0.5 in equation 1 allows for ei to equal e¯ in
expectation. While a restriction, the functional form of of (1) still allows for a wide range
of distributions that capture the key elements of the model.
In particular, values are affiliated, with both a private component and a component
that is shared across the entire population of uncapped firms. This framework allows for
a parameterization of the degree to which the common or independent value aspects dom-
inate. If a = 0, then baseline emissions are perfectly correlated across firms. At the other
extreme, if e¯ = .5a, then the realized baseline emissions of every firm are independently
determined. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which demonstrates how a varying level of
a changes the distribution of individual firm emissions. The regulator does not ex-ante
observe either component. It forms an expectation eˆ of e¯, that, as I discuss below, may be
biased.
With imperfect information, the regulator estimates a baseline for firms in the uncapped
sector. Under our framework, this takes the form of the expected emissions eˆ. Firms in
the uncapped sector are then eligible to sell their offset emissions into the capped market
at price p, which, absent restrictions on the use of offsets is assumed to equal the price of
allowances in the capped market.
2.2 Offset Sales
We first define the marginal firm that would sell offsets under this structure, and then
examine the resulting abatement costs and emissions levels that are implied by offset
sales. An individual firm i in the uncapped market that sells offsets at price p will earn
net profits equal to
pii = peˆ− cucei = peˆ− cuc[a(θi − .5) + e¯]. (2)
The former term is the earnings from selling eˆ offsets, which is equal to the level of
abatement estimated by the regulator, and the latter term is the firm’s cost of abating
8
Figure 2: Offset Market with Perfect Information
9
from its true baseline level, ei down to zero. With perfect information, the regulator would
set eˆ = ei and a firm would sell offsets if the price was less than their marginal cost of
abatement cuc. With imperfect information, the marginal cost of selling offsets diverges
from the true marginal cost of abatement since an individual firm may have to abate more
or less than eˆ.
Let θγrepresent the type (or baseline) of the marginal offset selling firm. This firm is
indifferent to selling offsets, such that piγ = 0, or equivalently
p =
cuc[a(θγ − .5) + e¯]
eˆ
. (3)
Since offsets equal to θγ eˆ are sold at this price, reductions from the capped sector
amount to ec − qcap − θγ eˆ. Let Ac = ec − qcap be the required amount of abatement from
the capped sector. Since the capped sector is providing the consumer side of the offset
market, this means the price can also be defined in terms of the marginal buyer of offsets,
who will have abatement cost equal to
p = c′c(A
c − θγ eˆ) = cuc[a(θγ − .5) + e¯]
eˆ
. (4)
This amount of abatement allows us to specify the emissions price in terms of abatement
in the capped sector.
Lemma 1 If abatement costs in the capped sector are convex, c′′c > 0, the marginal offset
baseline type θγ, is decreasing in e¯.
Proof. Using the equality defined in (4) we can apply the implicit function theorem to
derive dθγ
de¯
. Consider the rightmost equality the inverse “supply” of offsets S(θγ, e¯) and the
left equality the inverse demand for offsets, D(θγ), then
dθγ
de¯
=
∂S(θγ ,e¯)
∂e¯
dD(θγ)
dθγ
− ∂S(θγ ,e¯)
∂θγ
=
cuc/eˆ
−c′′c eˆ− acuc/eˆ
=
cuc
−c′′c eˆ2
− 1
a
.
Given the assumption of convexity of abatement costs in the capped sector c′′c > 0, we
have dθγ
de¯
< 0.
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In later sections, we will explore a specific example with further restrictions that greatly
simplify the illustration of the results. This later restriction is not necessary for any of
the results shown later, but does simplify the examples substantially. We now turn to the
derivation of the levels of emissions that result from offset sales, with special focus on the
question of imperfect estimates of the distribution of baselines.
2.3 Offsets and Excess Emissions
In the presence of imperfect information, the actual abatement can differ from that implied
by the sales of offsets. The abatement provided by offsets will depend upon both the
extent of adverse selection of low θi types into the offset program, as well as the overall
shared unconstrained emissions level e¯. There are, however, very different consequences
in terms of actual emissions from each type of information asymmetry. Although, with a
low actual baseline e¯ many firms will be paid to do what they would have done anyway,
the fact remains that they did reduce their emissions. The key issue is whether their
participation in the offset market implies that there are other firms in the uncapped sector
with abnormally large baseline emissions who did not participate. If the information shock
is applied to the shared component of the baseline estimate e¯ then this form of adverse
selection effect would not be created.
Before we explore these alternative implications, we begin by examining the case where
the forecast of aggregate baseline emissions is accurate (e.g. eˆ = e¯). Because of the private
information on baselines, the actual baseline for any subset of the capped sector may still
be less than or greater than eˆ. Total emissions from the uncapped sector will be
Euc = e¯+ a
∫ 1
0
θdF − 0.5a = eˆ. (5)
To illustrate the self-selection of firms into the offset market, we return to the case
where true abatement costs are equal in the two sectors, and normalized to 1. Figure 3
illustrates the results from introducing an offset market under these assumptions. Before
introducing offsets the cap is set by intersecting the marginal benefits of abatement, B(A),
with the marginal cost of abatement in the capped sector, cc, here assumed to equal
1. Although actual abatement costs are equal in the two sectors, the marginal cost of
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providing offsets, eicuc, ia lower for half the uncapped population. This is because their
true baseline emissions from which they must abate are lower than the regulator’s estimate.
The horizontal axis now represents the measured “abatement” that is transacted, rather
than actual abatement. Note that offsets are actually more costly for those firms with
higher than predicted baselines, because these firms would get less credit than they deserve
for their reductions . Thus the firms with the lowest actual baselines have the lowest
“costs,” and in a competitive market these will be firms selling offsets. Recall that θγ is
the marginal firm selling offsets. This will be the firm whose costs equals the permit price
in the capped market, as illustrated in figure 3, which I denote as cuc(θγ).
Figure 3: Offset Market with Independent Unbiased Emissions Rates
Since the share of the uncapped market selling offsets is θγ, the offsets transacted
equals eˆθγ. Since the low-baseline firms participate and the high baseline firms do not, the
actual reductions from the uncapped sector will be less than the offsets traded and total
emissions from the uncapped sector will be greater than the official estimate of (1− θγ)eˆ.
The resulting emissions are illustrated on the left of figure ??. Although the regulator’s
estimate of total emissions is correct, the self selection of low-baseline firms into the offset
program leaves only high-baseline firms without abatement. The result, as summarized
by the solid black area, is more emissions than anticipated from the uncapped sector and
therefore more emissions overall.
This is essentially the framework examined by Montero (2000). If I assume that the
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cap is set with optimal desired emissions levels in mind, this excess of pollution becomes a
potentially serious problem. If abatement costs are lower in the uncapped sctor, however,
there are also savings, as overall abatement expenditures are reduced. Montero demon-
strates these trade-offs.7
2.4 Imperfect Information on the Distribution of Baselines
Having laid the foundations of the offset market under the assumption that the regulators
estimate of aggregate emissions were accurate, we now derive more general outcomes when
these estimates may be inaccurate. First, when offsets are sold, the actual emissions from
the uncapped sector, which come from the portion (1−θγ) of firms that do not sell offsets,
are
(1− θγ)) (e¯− .5a) + a
∫ 1
θγ
θdF (θ).
Note that emissions from the capped sector are qcap + eˆθγ. This is the cap level plus
the additional emissions permitted by the sale of offsets.
Since θ is uniform, total emissions from both sectors can be simplified to
qcap + eˆθγ + (1− θγ) (e¯− .5a) + .5a− .5aθ2γ (6)
By subtracting the emissions that would result if there were no offsets sold, qcap + e¯,
we calculate the net increase in emissions from selling offsets as
θγ (eˆ− e¯) + .5aθγ(1− θγ) (7)
Several important observations follow from the effect captured in equation (7). First,
if expected emissions eˆ overstate the actual average emission level e¯, the introduction of
offsets will definitely increase total emissions from the two sectors. For lower e¯, the “costs”
of selling offsets decreases as firms have to abate less due to their lower true baselines.
7If unlimited transfers are allowed, optimal emissions levels can still be obtained by anticipating the
adverse selection and reducing the cap in the capped sector by the amount of excess emissions produced
by the offsets.
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Conversely, if the regulator underestimates average emissions, offsets may or may not
increase total emissions. In this scenario, it is possible that firms may sell offsets even
though they don’t get full credit for them. This would occur if abatement costs were
sufficiently low in the uncapped sector that the costs savings overcome the under-crediting.
Even with the underestimate of the average, however, it would still be the lowest baseline
types who would be first to sell offsets. Thus, while the average uncapped firm may not get
enough offset credit, the lowest baseline among them may still be over-credited. The net
effect is captured in (7), where the first term, which is negative when eˆ < e¯, represents this
“give-back” due to under-crediting, but the second term represents the effect of adverse
selection within the uncapped population.
Last, if the forecast of average baselines is accurate, then eˆ = e¯, and offsets can only
increase aggregate emissions due to the adverse selection captured in the second term of
(7).
The important point is that although the introduction of offsets can frequently lead to
an increase in emissions, those increases will be the largest under conditions when they do
the least harm. Although emissions always increase when baselines are overestimated and
an offest program is used, this increase may push total emissions closer to the optimum.
This is because actual emissions are lower for all uncapped firms, whether they sell offsets
or not.
If we assume that the cap was set at an optimum level, taking into account emissions
from the uncapped sector, then the desired aggregate emissions level (from both sectors)
is qcap + eˆ. In other words, the emissions cap may have been set with the assumption that
eˆ would be emitted from the uncapped sector. Using the framework from above, actual
emissions without any offset sales would be qcap + e. When baselines are overstated, this
quantity is below the capped target, and offset sales bring total emissions back toward the
aggregate target.
We can now revisit the concept of excess emissions, which we define as emissisions
created by offsets that are in excess of the aggregate emissions cap, qcap + eˆ.
Definition 1 Let the excess emissions caused by offsets be defined as the increase in emis-
sions above the level expected by the regulator in the absence of offsets, that is caused by the
introduction of offsets. Without offsets, expected emissions are qcap + eˆ, and the deviation
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from this level would be driven by how far actual emissions in the uncapped sector deviate
from expected emissions, eˆ− e¯ .
θγ (eˆ− e¯) + .5aθγ(1− θγ)−max(eˆ− e¯, 0). (8)
Using this definition, we can derive the following results relating to the overestimation
and the underestimation of the mean baseline e¯.
Result 1 If eˆ > e¯ then there will be excess emissions from offsets only if .5aθγ > (eˆ− e¯) .
Proof. If eˆ > e¯, then (8), reduces to .5aθγ(1 − θγ) − (1 − θγ) (eˆ− e¯) . Recall that
0 < θγ < 1. Therefore total emissions will be greater than the expected level of qcap + eˆ
only if .5aθγ > (eˆ− e¯) .
This conclusion is illustrated in Figure ??. The overestimation of mean baselines implies
that, absent offset sales, total emissions would be lower than expected by eˆ− e¯. The offset
sales, result in a combination of profit-taking and adverse selection, with the adverse
selection component equal to the triangle .5aθγ. The net effect will be above expected
emissions levels only in the event that the adverse selection component overwhelms the
“pleasant surprise.”
Result 2 If eˆ− e¯ < 0, then there are excess emissions only if .5aθγ > θγ(1−θγ) (e¯− eˆ) .
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of excess emissions. In this case there
are trade-offs between the relative costs of abatement in the two-sectors and the effect of
adverse selection.
Note that as long as the payout is greater than their costs, peˆ > eicuc, firms will chose
to sell offsets. If abatement costs are significantly lower in the uncapped sector, firms may
therefore wish to sell offsets even though eˆ < ei, and they have to abate more than they
are given credit for in the offset market. This average “give back” by firms selling offsets,
equal to θγ(eˆ− e¯) may or may not be sufficient to offset the adverse selection component,
.5aθγ(1− θγ).
Result 3 If a = 0, then offsets cannot produce excess emissions.
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Proof. if a = 0, then offsets increase emissions by θγ(eˆ − e¯). If eˆ − e¯ > 0 this does
not sufficiently offset the overall surprisingly low emissions in the entire sector of eˆ− e¯ as
θγ ∈ (0..1). Total emissions will still be less than qcap+ eˆ. If eˆ− e¯ < 0, then offsets produce
“additional” emissions of θγ(eˆ− e¯), which is negative.
Combined, these results reflect the factors that determine the extent to which adverse
selection is harmful. In particular, the importance of the distribution of baselines is high-
lighted. If baselines are highly correlated amongst the uncapped population, then a is very
small and there is relatively little damage from the adverse selection. If mean baselines are
overestimated, the surprisingly low emissions from the entire sector is likely to dominate.
Conversely, if mean baseline emissions are underestimated, then emissions from the
uncapped sector as a whole are surprisingly high. If costs in the two sectors are similar,
selling offsets can increase the level of emissions, but likely not by much since most firms
will have baselines above the regulators estimated level.
This result is similar but not necessarily identical to what would happen if both sectors
were capped. If both were capped, then the lower baselines could lower the aggregate
abatement necessary without requiring active abatement from the uncapped sector. This
can be more efficient as active abatement still costs cuc. If the abatement quantity required
from the capped sector yields a marginal abatement cost, after accounting for the lower
baselines, that is less than cuc, it would be more efficient for all active abatement to come
from the capped sector - even though less active abatement would be required due to the
lower baselines. In this case the “maximal cap” would be more efficient. This efficiency
penalty from offsets is therefore going to be the most severe when costs are high in the
uncapped sector, but baselines are low.
These results also reveal how, somewhat ironically, the adverse selection problem can
cause the most problems when the regulator has an accurate forecast of mean baselines. As
the difference between eˆ and e¯ goes to zero, the adverse selection term .5aθγ will dominate
and produce excess emissions.
In summary, the implications of the adverse selection problem is tied strongly to the as-
sumptions about the distribution of “errors” in the forecast of business as usual emissions.
If this error is independently distributed across firms, offsets can produce under-abatement.
If the errors are highly correlated, however, the offset market can reveal information about
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the aggregate baseline and allow the abatement decisions of firms in the capped sector to
adjust accordingly.
2.5 Constant Marginal Abatement Costs.
The derivations above imply a broad set of conditions under which offset markets compress
the range of aggregate emissions. In particular, by permitting more “non-additional”
sales under the circumstances where uncapped emissions are surprisingly low, aggregate
emissions are less likely to fall substantially below the expected levels implied by the cap.
This self-adjustment in the face of low emissions is to be weighed against the potential
for exacerbating emissions in the event of surprisingly high emissions from the uncapped
sector. If emissions baselines are highly correlated across uncapped firms, this risk is
relatively small.
We now examine a case with constant marginal costs of abatement in the both sectors in
order to illustrate the effects of offsets on the distributions of potential aggregate emissions.
Assumption A5: Marginal abatement costs cc = 1 in the capped sector and cuc = αcc = α
in the uncapped sector.
Under this assumption we analytically derive θγ as a function of the emission baseline
distributional parameters, e¯ and a. Recall that the marginal uncapped firm to sell offsets
will have its marginal cost of selling offsets equal to the permit price, or marginal cost of
abatement, in the capped sector.
θγ =
cceˆ− cuce¯+ .5cuca
cuca
=
eˆ− αe¯
αa
+ .5 (9)
where α may be less than or greater than 1, depending upon the relative costs of abatement
in the two sectors. Two further conditions on θγ must hold, namely that offset sales are
non-negative and that total offset purchases must be no greater than the capped quantity
in the capped sector. These boundary conditions would take precedence over (9).
0 < θγ <
Ec − qcap
eˆ
. (10)
By combining (9) and (6) we can express total emissions in a market with offsets as
qcap + eˆ
(
eˆ− αe¯
αa
+ .5
)
+ (1−
(
eˆ− αe¯
αa
+ .5
)
)
(
e¯+ .5a
(
eˆ− αe¯
αa
+ .5
))
(11)
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Table 1: Constant Marginal Cost Sample Parameters
Parameter Value/Range
Ec 10
qcap 2.5
Euc = e¯ 5-15
eˆ 10
a 1,5,10
α .75, 1, 1.25
as long as 0 < θγ <
(Ec−qcap
eˆ
.8
We can further simplify (11) when looking at specific cases. For example, if a = 2e¯,then
θγ =
eˆ
αa
= eˆ
α2e¯
, and we can write total emissions as
qcap + e¯+ eˆ
(
eˆ
2αe¯
)
− e¯
(
eˆ2
(2αe¯)2
)
. (12)
Another case of interest arises if we assume costs are equal in the two sectors, or α = 1.
In this case (11) simplifies to
qcap + e¯+ .5
(
(eˆ− e¯)
a
2
+ (eˆ− e¯)
)
+ .125a. (13)
By assigning specific values to eˆ and e¯, we can illustrate the effect offsets have on total
emissions.
In Table 1, we describe the range of parameters considered for this example. The
expected mean baseline is eˆ = 10, and the actual mean baseline can range from e¯ = 5 to
e¯ = 15. Actual emissions without offsets will be qcap + e¯. Actual emissions with offsets are
defined by equation (11), for θγ that is bounded by 0 and (Ec − qcap)/eˆ = .75
Figure ?? provides a histogram of realizations for total emissions under the assumption
that e¯ is distributed according to a uniform, normal, or gamma, distribution. In each case,
total emissions are plotted in the case where the cap is set at .75eˆ in the capped sector
and there are no offset sales, and again assuming that offsets up to .75eˆ are allowed.
8If θγ =
(Ec−qcap)
eˆ ,this becomes qcap + eˆ
(Ec−qcap)
eˆ + (1− (Ec−qcap)eˆ )
(
e¯+ .5a
(
(Ec−qcap)
eˆ
))
.
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3 Discussion
As the previous sections demonstrate, the question of additionality can be viewed in two
lights; the adverse selection view, in which offsets pay the “wrong” firms to reduce while
other firms more than make up the difference, and one in which uncapped firms benefit
from a coincidental, surprisingly clean development path. In some circumstances there can
be an important distinction between the two types of additionality. If the offset market
were dominated by the latter “pleasant surprise” phenomenon, offsets can play a useful
role despite the additionality problem.
Of course the degree to which this distinction matters is closely linked to the level of
the cap in the capped sector. In the context of Kyoto treaty the reductions implied are
so modest that any prospect of a pleasant surprise would not come close to making up
the overall reductions called for by the IPCC and other groups. In short, most view the
Kyoto treaty as so lax that the world needs every ton of reductions it can produce. This is
reflected in the fact that there has been relatively little market for excess reduction credits
from Annex 1 Kyoto nations, such as Russia and the U.K., because those excess credits
are viewed as coincidental. These credits, known as “hot air,” have largely been shunned,
although this picture could change as Kyoto deadlines approach.9 The distinction also has
less meaning in the context of voluntary offset markets, where there is no mandatory cap
to be adjusted.
Looking forward to a post-Kyoto world, however, the implications change somewhat. If
a significant share of developed nations commit to proposed targets of 50% to 80% reduc-
tions, a pleasant surprise scenario could influence thinking about the needed stringency of
those caps.10 The potential stringency of future caps is largely dependent upon a political
process, and the potential role of offsets plays a part in those negotiations. Those close
to this process acknowledge that a tighter cap in the U.S. would be much more likely to
gain acceptance if offsets are a part of the picture. If caps in the developed world are set
ambitiously enough, this may not be the kind of Faustian bargain that critics of offset
markets make it out to be.
On the other hand, if the worst-case IPCC scenarios materialize, even 80 % reductions
9Grubb, et. al, 2010
10The Annex I nations under the Kyoto protocol account for roughly half of global GHG emissions
today, but under the IPCC A2 scenario this share would decline to under 1/3.
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from developed nations would be insufficient to achieve a stabilization of GHG at levels
deemed acceptable by the IPCC. Active abatement would have to be pursued in developing
countries. Even under these circumstances offsets can play an important role for some
sectors of developing countries.
Figure 4: Emissions Trajectories of IPCC Scenarios
An examination of the IPCC scenarios (figure 4) for future BAU GHG emissions reveals
just how much scope there is for an impact of a coincidentally clean development path.
There is a great deal of uncertainty about future emissions, with much of that uncertainty
falling in the developing world. While fossil-fuel intensive, high population scenarios imply
roughly a tripling of emissions by 2100, other scenarios imply a peak around 2050 followed
by a steady decline.
Another key question is therefore whether additionality is likely to reflect adverse se-
lection or common low baselines. In the case studied by Montero (2000), power plants
that opted into the SO2 program had low baselines because their output was reduced, to
be replaced by other plants. The case studies of the CDM appear to be different matters.
There is evidence that many projects earned emissions reduction credits while not meet-
ing the broad definition of additionality. The power plant projects identified in India and
China may very well have not been additional, but their construction did not imply higher
output from some other power facilities.
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4 Implications for Offset Market Design
The above discussion attempts to highlight three implications. First, not all forms of
additionality should be viewed as equally onerous to the effectiveness and efficiency of
emissions caps. Second, the perverse incentives to manipulate baselines are an equally
serious concern with no redeeming qualities. Third, offset markets can produce several
other types of unintended consequences such as leakage, but those risks apply to almost
any measures directed at reducing GHG emissions at less than a global scale. The current
regulatory focus on additionality tends to paint all these problems with a broad brush
without consideration of the context or their implications.
With these observations in mind, it is useful to consider the various policy tools that
have been adopted or considered in order to address the perceived difficulties with offset
mechanisms. Importantly, two frequently mentioned solutions, capping the number of
offsets and discounting their effectiveness, do not address these problems very well. A
cap on the number of offsets allowed into a market can limit the overall severity of the
adverse selection problem, but by less than commonly thought. If adverse selection is a
serious problem, the projects that are allowed would be the ones with the lowest baseline
draws. If the baselines in the uncapped sector are instead highly correlated and much
lower than expected, then limits on offsets restrict the ability of the mechanism to adjust
to the “pleasant surprise” and allow for fewer reductions in the capped sector.
A devaluation of offsets treats all projects as equally non-additional. As I have argued
above, if this truly were the case and caps were strict enough in the capped sector, this is
precisely when additionality does not reduce efficiency. In fact it produces the exact same
outcome as if the uncapped sector were under a mandatory cap and had been allocated
allowances equal to its expected baseline. In either case, emissions are reduced and the
uncapped sector reaps a windfall. However, both sectors benefit from the added partic-
ipation of the uncapped sector relative to a case where that participation is limited. If
instead baselines are uncorrelated, and additionality is a serious problem, only the most
extreme non-additional projects are likely to be financially viable at the reduced returns
provided by a generic devaluation.
The solution identified by Montero is very different. A first-best reduction can be
achieved if the cap were further tightened in anticipation of the excess emissions yielded
from adverse selection in the uncapped sector. This allows full participation by the un-
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capped sector, but still reaches the same overall emissions aggregated over both sectors.
Unfortunately, this approach is both politically difficult and depends upon accurately pre-
dicting, on a sectoral level, the severity of the adverse selection problem.
To date the primary bulwark against additionality concerns has been a review process
that has been simultaneously criticized as too onerous to allow for substantial investment
and also inadequate in weeding out non-additional projects.11 While some are concerned
this may fatally delay investments, others feel that the incentive problems can only be
adequately managed within a small program.
Those concerned with streamlining the review process are attracted to a shift away
from project-specific review to a more programmatic approach. This offers several potential
benefits. First, a programmatic approach can greatly lower the transactions costs of review
and certification relative to the value of the offsets produced. Second, such an approach
can help access a broader array of activities including energy efficiency and prevention
of deforestation that have been largely absent from markets such as the CDM. Last, a
program level review can focus on risks, at an industry level, of the “bad” form of adverse
selection while being less concerned with correlated, coincidental reductions. For example,
investments in building efficiency may very well prove to be economic in the absence of
offset programs, and therefore not truly additional. But even if that is the case, increased
efficiency in one building is unlikely to imply worse efficiency in others. A programmatic
approach can also mitigate the moral hazard problem at the facility level by reducing the
importance of the actions at a specific facility. However, there are still concerns about
government level incentives.
Last, one tool that has not been applied to offset markets is the application of random-
ized trials. For example, a population of applications could be chosen to supply offsets
while another set is retained as a control group against which to judge the actions of the
accepted population. This may be usefully combined with a shift in focus to evaluation
at the program or sector level. Such approaches have been usefully applied to address
similar adverse selection and moral hazard problems in programs that pay for reductions
in energy use.12 Atypical increases in emissions from countries or firms that become el-
igible for offsets relative to those that are not would indicate an inflation of baselines.
Measuring the reductions from offset eligible projects relative to others can detect adverse
11Grubb, et. al. 2010, Victor and Wara, 2008.
12Wolak, 2010.
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selection relative to a common baseline, but it would also discount gains from commonly
shared (e.g. coincidental) reductions. Since, returning to the earlier discussion, there are
circumstances in which it is beneficial to allow credits for those coincidental reductions,
the treatment of these shared effects would depend upon the stringency of overall caps.
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